We present a theoretical model in tourism economics, assuming that the market for tourism is an oligopoly with differentiated products. Destinations (i.e., countries, regions, sites or even firms) can invest in order to improve their carrying capacity that can be interpreted as the stock of physical, natural or cultural resources. Tourism flows yield current revenues, but they are usually detrimental for the cultural or natural resource stock over time. We find the solution of the dynamic model, and in particular we find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game among the destinations, under alternative settings, depending on whether the arrivals are exogenous or endogenous, and depending on whether the degree of differentiation among destinations is exogenous or endogenous. The model is rather general, and it can provide answers to different specific questions, like the choice between mass-vs. elite-tourism development strategies; the effect of the number of competing products upon profits; the optimal degree of product differentiation.
Introduction
In this paper we take a microeconomic perspective, and in particular an "industrial organization" perspective, in order to study the optimal behavior of destinations, as concerns investment and tourism flow regulation over time. When we use the word "destination" we do not intend to necessarily refer to specific local sites, but countries, or regions, could be the appropriate level of analysis as well.
We assume that the market of tourism is an oligopoly, where differentiated products are supplied. The fact that the tourist goods are differentiated is, to some extent, obvious: not only different types of tourism do exist (e.g., sea-side or mountain resort tourism, cultural tourism, …), but tourist products are clearly differentiated even within the same type: the sea-side resort tourism in Bali is different from the sea-side resort tourism in Italy (and also, the sea-side resorts in Sicily are different from that in Sardinia!).
It is more important to discuss why we believe that the market is an oligopoly. Three points are worth stressing: first, the available tourist destinations are a given (though large) number, and the entry of new "suppliers" is costly; second, the number of the organizers of tourism flows (like the tour operators) is limited; third, some interaction among the destinations is present indeed: the choice of Italian firms (or Italian policymakers) concerning the tourist product clearly affects the optimal behavior of any other firms and policy-makers in that field over the world. For these reasons we believe that the differentiated oligopoly model is the appropriate tool to investigate the behavior in the tourism market. The literature developed by industrial organization about the optimal behavior of firms and policy-makers in market with differentiated products can be useful for tourism economics; to our knowledge, the available literature has overlooked this approach so far.
Of course, the tourism products present some specificity to be taken into account.
The tourism flows are necessary to give revenues; however, they usually have detrimental effects on the carrying capacity of the destination, that is, its natural and physical resources, as well as its cultural heritage. The carrying capacity, in turn, affects the consumer reservation price: the higher the carrying capacity is, the higher is the reservation price, ceteris paribus. 1 Moreover, the carrying capacity can be improved through appropriate investments: more precisely, costly appropriate investments can be useful to contrast the depletion entailed by tourism flows over time. For these reasons, we believe that a dynamic approach is necessary.
In particular, we take a differential game approach to study the investment efforts over time, made by tourist destinations, under alternative settings, according to whether tourism flows are choice variables for countries or not, and according to whether the degree of substitutability between different tourism goods is exogenous or it can be influenced by destinations. We find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential game among the destinations, and we focus on the steady-state allocations.
Our model is rather general and it can deal with different points. Three questions are specifically answered within our framework: (i) is it always convenient to develop an elite-tourism strategy rather than a mass-tourism strategy?; (ii) is it always convenient for a system to introduce new products (provided that its introduction costs are negligible)?; (iii) is it always convenient to increase the product differentiation?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the basic setup, and in particular the demand side. Section 3 investigates the case where the tourism flows are given, and the only choice variable of a tourism site is the amount of investment aimed at increasing its carrying capacity over time, and thus aimed at increasing consumers' reservation price. In a short digression (Section 3.1) we analyze the case that price is fixed (instead of the tourism flow), so that the possible increase of carrying capacity translates into an increase of the tourism flow instead of an increase of price. The digression allows us to derive some conclusions on whether a tourism development strategy based on fixedpresence is preferable with respect to a fixed-price/mass-tourism strategy. Section 4 takes into account the possibility that the tourist flows over time are one of the choice variables of the sites. In a short digression (Section 4.1) we focus on the effect of the number of competitors upon the individual and aggregate profits. Section 5 briefly discusses the case where investments aimed at affecting the degree of substitutability among tourism goods are possible. Section 6 gathers the conclusions.
The basics of the model
We consider the tourism market as an oligopoly under full information condition. At any time ( ) +∞ ∈ , 0 t , each destination i (i=1,2,…,n) offers a tourism product, which is differentiated with respect to the production of different destinations. Let x i (t) the tourists' presence in destination i at time t. Correspondingly, the price P i (t) is given by the inverse demand function:
(1)
Equation (1), firstly introduced by Bowley (1924) , is widely used in industrial organization theory (see, e.g., Spence, 1976 , Dixit, 1979 , Singh and Vives, 1984 . Parameter B>0 captures the sensitivity of the price of variety i to the quantity i. Parameter D, 0<D<B, captures the sensitivity of price of variety i to the quantity of goods of different variety; this means that parameter D captures the degree of substitutability between any pair of varieties: the lower is D, the less substitutable (i.e., more differentiated) are goods; in the limiting case D=B the varieties are perfectly substitutable (i.e., goods are homogeneous), and the homogeneous oligopoly case establishes; in the opposite limiting case, D=0, the differentiation is the largest, products are totally independent, and each supplier behaves as a monopolist.
In the available models, A is parameter capturing the market size or the highest reservation price. In this model we consider A i (t) as a variable rather than as a parameter. 2 We assume that the highest reservation price (or market size) for variety i is directly linked to the stock of its physical and natural resources, or to the stock of its cultural heritage, in a word, with its carrying capacity. This capacity vary over time, for three reasons: (i) the size of tourism flows, that is, the tourists' presence, x, have an impact on the stocks; (ii) the amount of investment aimed at protecting environment (or heritage), k, have a positive impact; (iii) a proportional natural depreciation (or even a proportional natural regeneration) may occur at the rate δ . Hence, we assume that the dynamics of variable A i (t) is described by the following equation:
Notice that if 0 > δ , a depreciation occurs (this could well be the case of cultural heritage); if 0 < δ the stock grows naturally (like in the case of environmental regeneration). In the remainder of the paper, we assume 0 > δ , but the model can be easily discussed under the alternative hypothesis. Similarly, the tourism flow x may exert a positive or negative effect on the product quality and hence on the carrying capacity, according to whether 0 < α , or 0 > α respectively. In the remainder of the paper we assume 1 = α , so that the case of the detrimental effect is posted; however, the model can be easily studied under the opposite case that tourism flow is beneficial to the carrying capacity of destination.
We assume that the investment k i entails a quadratic cost, captured by function ϕ :
ϕ which means that the marginal productivity of k i is decreasing. We also assume that the tourists' presence in destination i, x i , entails a production cost, according to the generic
Hence, the profit for destination i at time t is:
We assume that the objective of each destination is to achieve the maximum present value of the flows of its profits over time:
is the discounting rate, assumed to be equal across the destinations' population. The dynamic problem is subject to the constraint (2) and to the initial
. We solve the problem in three different settings, with increasing complexity.
(i) We assume that the dynamics of tourism flows are exogenous, for any destinations:
this means that the dynamics of variables x i (t), i=1,2,…n, are given, and the control variable for destination i is k i (t) only; the state variable is A i (t). In this simple case, analyzed in Section 3, there is no strategic interaction among destinations, and the problem is a straight optimum control problem.
(ii) We assume that each destination can control its tourists' presence in any time.
Consequently, the problem faced by destination i has two control variables, x i (t) and k i (t), and one state variable, A i (t); moreover, strategic interaction among destinations is present, since the presence in destination j affect the profit -and hence the optimal choice-of destination i. In this case, a differential game has to be solved. We adopt the open-loop Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, but in this case it coincides with the closed-loop memoryless Nash equilibrium, which is strongly time consistent.
(iii) We assume that the degree of differentiation, D, is a variable rather than a parameter, and it is possible to affect its value through costly investment, h, decided by destinations. In this case, a differential game arises, in which each destination faces a problem with three control variables, k i (t), x i (t), h i (t), and two state variables, A i (t) and D i (t). In this case, the open-loop Nash equilibrium differs from the closed-loop equilibrium and it is only weakly time-consistent.
3. Investment in protecting the environment in the presence of exogenous tourism flows
In this section we take into account the simple case that the destinations can not affect the tourism flows, i.e., variables x i (t) are exogenous; more specifically, we assume that x i are constant parameters. The problem faced by the destination i summarizes as follows:
The control variable is k i (t), and the state variable is A i (t). The corresponding Hamiltonian function is
λ is the current-value co-state variable associated to the state variable.
The first order condition and the adjoint equation for the maximum are:
to be considered along with the transversality condition 0 ) (
. The first and the second condition of system (8) respectively imply:
Differentiating eq. (9) with respect to time, and then substituting eq. (10), we obtain:
The simultaneous consideration of (11) and (2) describes the dynamic system under optimum condition, and can be represented in matrix notation as follows:
Notice that the motion equation are of type:
Provided that x i is constant over time, it is easy to verify that a steady state does exist From the study of matrix Ω , it is immediate to notice that the steady state, in the case under the above mentioned parameter restrictions, is a saddle, as long as:
. The stable branch coincides with the horizontal line k i =k i *.
3 The extension to the more general case that
is very simple. When α in eq. (2) is not necessarily equal to 1, the steady state is:
Let us focus on the steady-state point. Both the investment efforts and the size of resources stock depend positively on the parameter x i , which measures the size of tourism flow. The corresponding steady-state profit is:
Comparative statics exercises can be made, as parameter x i changes. The larger is x i , the larger are k i * and A i * . 4 More interestingly, notice that the parameter x i , has a nonmonotonic effect on the (steady-state) profit of destination i. Moreover, for any given level of x i , parameter D (and the sum of x j alike) has a negative effect on the profit of destination i. Verbally, the stronger is the product differentiation (i.e., the lower is parameter D), the higher the steady-state profit is. Finally, and rather trivially, the larger are the tourism flows in competing destinations, the lower the steady-state profit is in any given destination, ceteris paribus.
A digression: the fixed-price case
In the previous case, the increase of the carrying capacity of the destination translates into an increase of the price paid by tourists, given that tourism flows are constant by hypothesis. The opposite case, however, is equally possible: we can imagine that prices are constant parameters, and the modification of carrying capacity translates into a modification of tourism flow (see figure 2) . Roughly speaking, the former case corresponds to the situation where tourism flow is constant over time and the increasing carry-capacity translates into higher price; this is the case of a development strategy that we can label as "elite"-tourism. The latter case, on the contrary, corresponds to a strategy recalling the mass-tourism: the increase of carrying capacity translates into a larger presence of tourists, and price remains constant over time. The model allows verifying that the parameter configuration determines which case is more convenient, in terms of (steady-state) profit. In the fixed-price case, it is convenient to deal with direct demand function. The direct demand corresponding to inverse function (1) is: 5
where n denotes the number of destinations. (Notice that the limit case D=B describes the homogeneous oligopoly model, and the individual demand functions are indeterminate, as it is well-known from the Bertrand model). Let p i be the constant value of price in destination i. For the sake of analytical simplicity, we also assume that marginal costs of production are constant,
. The dynamic problem of destination i (with k i as the choice variable and A i the state variable) gives rise to the following steady state:
Straightforward substitutions lead to the steady-state profit.
We are interested in comparing the steady-state allocations and profits under the two alternative settings, i.e., the fixed-presence ("elite"-development) case and the fixedprice ("mass"-development) case.
First of all, it is worth noticing that marginal cost of production enters the steadystate levels of variables only in the case of the "mass"-tourism development strategy: this is obvious, given that the increase in the amount of presence entails, in this case, increasing production cost. Of course, the marginal cost c' i has to be sufficiently small in order to have meaningful solutions for the problem in this case. 6 In other words, the marginal cost of production represents a constraint which can be severe in the case of "mass-torusim" development strategy: high marginal cost can prevent the possibility of mass-development strategy.
Secondly, steady-state profits depend on a number of parameters, and the parameter configuration determines whether the "elite" development leads to a larger steady-state profit as compared to the "mass" development. Both cases are, in principle, possible; 7 this means that, under some parameter configurations, mass tourism (if possible) can lead to higher profit as compared to elite tourism. Moreover, appropriate shocks on parameter may cause a "switch" as concerns the more convenient development strategy. This observation may explain why destinations change their tourism development strategy, moving from "elite" destination to "mass" destination (or vice versa).
4. The optimal plans when tourism flows are endogenously set by destinations Now we take into account the case that the tourism flows are neither exogenously given (nor constant over time), but they are choice variables of destinations. This is to some extent realistic, as long as destinations can choose different policies as concerns the size of admissible tourists. In such a case, the Hamiltonian function associated to the dynamic problem of destination i is still eq. (7), but x i (t) is a control variable for player i, as well as x j (t) is a control variable of player j. Strategic interaction is indeed present and we are facing a differential game, as long as A i (and any A j alike) moves over time. The law describing the dynamics of A i (t) is still eq. (2), and the market demand is still eq. (1).
6 It is immediate to see that c' i <p i must hold, for having k i >0; if marginal costs are increasing (instead of constant) they must be limited from above. 7 In general, parameters interact in a very complex way, and it is difficult to find clear-cut comparative statics conclusions. However, numerical simulations are easy to compute. Just to give an examples, set z=1, B=4, D=. . The steady state profit under the fixedpresence case turns out to be .11, which is larger than the steady-state profit under the fixed presence development strategy, for 0<x i <.04. Of course, and rather trivially, the given level of fixed presence (as well as the given value of fixed price) are relevant parameters for determining the more convenient development strategy. Nash equilibrium and it is therefore strongly time-consistent (see also below, footnote 9).
The first order conditions and the adjoint equations pertaining to player i, when x i is a choice variables are as follows: The three conditions of system (15) imply, respectively:
Another strongly time-consistent (and therefore subgame perfect) solution concept is the feedback equilibrium using Bellman's equation. For a clear exposition of the difference among these equilibrium solutions see Basar and Olsder (1982, pp. 318-327 , and chapter 6, in particular Proposition 6.1). There exist classes of games where the closed-loop and the open-loop solutions coincide (see Mehlmann, 1988, ch. 4; Reinganum, 1982; Fershtman, 1987; Fershtman, Kamien and Muller, 1992; Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long and Sorger, 2000, ch. 7, Cellini and Lambertini, 2001) . 9 We have not inserted the dynamics of state variables A j , j≠i, in the problem if player i, since it is immaterial to the solution: it is true that A j represent state variables also for player i, but A j does not affect the optimal value of the control variables of player i. Technically, the game has "separated dynamics". This property entails that the open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides, in the present case, with the closed-loop equilibrium, since there is no feedback from the state variable pertaining to a player to the control variables of the other players (see also Cellini and Lambertini, 2001 , for further details in a similar game). (16) we can obtain the reaction curve, which links x i with the sum of x j .
Then, we impose the symmetry condition x i =x j =x ∀i,j, so that
we assume A i =A j =A, k i =k j =k, ∀i,j. Thus, the equilibrium under symmetry condition turns out to imply:
Intuitively, the left-hand side of equation (19) can be interpreted as the marginal revenue from the tourism presence, while the right-hand side represents the marginal cost, taking into account that the tourism flows generate damages to the natural resources stock that must be paid (according to addendum zk(t)).
Differentiate eq. (19) and eq. (17) w.r.t. time, and consider them along with eq. (18) and (2); in the resulting dynamic system , the relevant variables are x(t), k(t), A(t).
It is easy to find the steady state of such a system. Condition
; substituting these values into equation (19) we obtain:
Eq. (20) gives the steady-state value of variable x. Also in this case we can offer an intuitive explanation for the optimality condition (20): it requires to equate the marginal cost of tourism flow (the right-hand side) with the marginal revenue from tourism (the left-hand side). However, a relevant problem is present in the steady-state solution of the problem at hand, as compared to a standard static problem: a larger tourism flow, x, requires a larger k in steady state (ceteris paribus); this -in turn-may imply a larger market size, A. The steady-state market size, hence, is positively related to the steady-state quantity of good x.
Consequently, the marginal revenue is not necessarily a decreasing function of the sold quantity. Put differently, the first order condition (20) is not necessarily associated to a maximum point, but it could be associated to a minimum point, the maximum being a corner solution (if it exists). This issue is well-known in similar problems in environmental economics. 10 
, the marginal revenue is decreasing and non-positive for any positive value of x. Consequently, the corner solution x=0 is the optimum. (21) ) (
otherwise, the point identifies a minimum.
In sum, the dynamic problem can lead to a steady state with a positive and finite value for x, only under condition (21) in case (b3). We focus on this case. We are interested in some comparative statics on the equilibrium steady-state allocation. To this end, let us consider eq. (20) as an implicit function g(.)=0:
We can apply to (22) the implicit function theorem, in order to study how the steady-state value of x react to the parameters; provided that 1 0 < < δ , we obtain:
Just to have an explicit solution, consider the particular case where the marginal cost is the increasing and convex function c'(x)=cx 2 , c>0, so that the cost function (apart from fixed costs) is c(x)=cx 3 /3. In this particular case, the steady-state solution for x is:
It is immediate to verify that the comparative statics properties outlined by (23) hold in the particular case of (24); moreover, in this case,
The economic meaning of these properties is easily explained: (i) the larger is the number of destinations competing with substitutable products, n, the smaller the steadystate individual production of each destination in the symmetric Nash equilibrium is.
(ii)
The larger is B (ceteris paribus), the smaller the marginal revenue, and hence the smaller the optimal amount of sold product. (iii) The larger is D the less differentiated are the products: competition among destinations is harsher and the marginal revenues are lower:
this leads to a smaller optimal production. (iv) The higher is the investment cost in protecting the natural stock (connected with parameter z), the smaller the optimal amount is of tourists' presence.
As a last remark, we note that, in the case of the present section, the closed-loop Nash equilibrium collapses into the open-loop: the latter is therefore strongly time consistent. This is due to the fact that there is no feedback from the current value of state variables to the current value of control variables, so that the possibility of changing the choice during the time where the game takes place is pointless.
A digression: the effect of the number of products
The model can easily provide an answer to a simple question: is it always convenient -for the system of destinations-to introduce new products? Just to give a real and up-to-date example, let us think of the debate among Italian and Croatian Adriatic destinations concerning the convenience of offering a "new package" (i.e., a new destination) of integrated stay in Italy and Croatia. We can assume that the introduction cost of this destination is negligible, so that we can simply study how the (steady-state) aggregate profits depends on n.
It is easy to check that the maximum profit (in steady state) for the system of the destinations is not a monotonic function of the number of products. Indeed, focussing on the steady-state profit (under the hypothesis of an interior solution), it is immediate to find that the aggregate profits, π n = Π is a function of degree 4 in n. In fact, n affects (negatively) the individual optimal production, x, and consequently the production cost c(x) and the investment efforts in carrying capacity, k, and the reservation price A; the effect on price is not clearcut as long as steady-state levels of both A and x depend negatively on n. Hence, it is not surprising that the aggregate profits are not necessarily increasing in the number of products. Put differently, we can state that an increase of the number of products, even if it is costless, does not necessarily lead to a larger aggregate profit. 12
From the policy-making perspective, the introduction of a new product within the Adriatic tourism, affects the equilibrium values of investment in carrying capacity, the reservation prices of tourists, the optimal quantities and prices; the dimension of such effects are rather complicate to compute, and no simple recommendation is possible in this case. Moreover, as a note of caution on this consideration, remember that in this model the number of products coincides with the number of destination, and the focus is only on the steady state of the symmetric equilibrium.
Investing in product differentiation
Now we sketch the optimal solution in the case that destinations can invest in order to increase the product differentiation. To this end, remember that, up to now, we considered D as a parameter, capturing the degree of differentiation between any pair of tourism products. Strictly speaking, D is a parameter connected with the consumer preferences, but we can guess that it reflects the fact that destinations are objectively differentiated, thanks to difference in natural resources, history, tradition, and so on.
To some extent, however, the differentiation may be modified, by appropriate investment efforts by part of destinations, for instance through advertising efforts. In this respect, the degree of differentiation becomes a state variable, which is affected -at least in part-by appropriate investment. Thus, in this Section we treat D as a variable moving over time, as a result of investment efforts. Notice, however, that D is common to all destinations, since D denotes the symmetric degree of differentiation among products. In this respect, D is a public good.
12 Just to give a numerical example, if we set z=.1, B=1, D=.5, Given the symmetric nature of product differentiation in this model, there exists a complete spillover effect in investment process: just to give a trivial example, when Las Vegas invests in order to offer a more and more differentiated product, any other site over the world becomes more and more differentiated with respect to Las Vegas! Notice that the externality effect we consider here entails that the outcome of investment activity is public domain via the demand function. On the contrary, the externality effects usually considered in the literature are associated with information leakage or transmission (see, inter alia, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) .
We assume that the cost of the investment effort in differentiation obeys the linear
Hence, the individual problem faced by destination i is:
The control variables in this problem are x i (t), k i (t), h i (t), while A i (t) and D(t), are the state The first order conditions and adjoint equations pertaining to x i (t), k i (t) and A i (t) are the same as (16), (17) and (18), apart from the fact that D has to be interpreted a variable rather than as a parameter; moreover two further conditions have to be considered:
• Equation (27) can be solved under the symmetry assumption h i (t)=h j (t)=h, ∀i,j, (along with similar symmetry assumptions concerning x and k) and a function linking h to D can be obtained. Differentiation w.r.t. time and appropriate substitutions lead to obtain:
The case D(t)=0, describes the situation where products have become completely independent, so that it is pointless to invest further in product differentiation.
The case where
describes a steady state, where a certain degree of substitutability among products is indeed present. Notice that this solution is incomplete, as long as x itself has to be interpreted as the steady-state value of x, which depends on the parameters (and, in particular, negatively depends on variable D itself, according to first order condition (16)). Moreover, appropriate conditions on parameter have to be posed, in order to guarantee that the solution is economically meaningful and acceptable. However, the positive direct effect of w on D is rather obvious: the higher is the investment cost, the higher the optimal level of D, that is, the lower the optimal effort for investment in differentiation is.
In order to find a solution for the steady-state configuration it is not sufficient to postulate a quadratic marginal cost function c(x): in this case, a cubic equation has to be solved, and we need further numerical constraint to find the solution analytically.
As to the economic meaning of the solution, it is worth noticing that each site compares the costly efforts of investing in differentiation with the benefits from product differentiation, and −in the Nash equilibrium solution concept− it chooses the optimal amount of efforts, given the efforts of his opponents. However, because of the complete externality from individual efforts to the degree of differentiation (which is common to all sites), the individual effort in product-differentiation is generally under-sized as compared to a cooperative solution. This result is common to the models on R&D investment (when investment have positive spillovers for the rivals) or to the models on advertising (when advertisement of a firm benefits all the competing firms as well). In sum, a positive level of differentiation is optimal for destinations, but the efforts in differentiation carried out by private agents are lower than the socially optimal level. As an immediate corollary of this point, we can state that some forms of inter-destination coordination, or appropriate policy interventions, are necessary to overcome the market inefficiency implied by the public-good nature of differentiation. This point is in our future research agenda.
Conclusions
In this article, we have argued that a differential model of differentiated oligopoly is appropriate to study tourism development strategies. As a matter of fact, tourism goods are differentiated; dynamic plans are necessary to sustain carrying capacity over time; more importantly, competition among different destinations takes place over time.
We have taken a truly microeconomic approach, to answer up-to date questions concerning the strategies for a sustainable development of tourism markets.
In particular, we have proposed a differential game approach to study the optimal plans of competing tourism destinations. Our general framework permits to deal with some specific points: (i) the determination of the time path of optimal investment in carrycapacity; (ii) the preferability of elite vs. mass tourism, (iii) the determination of the optimal amount of tourism flows and its interaction with product differentiation and with the available number of products; (iv) the optimal efforts of investment in product differentiation.
Unfortunately, when realistic hypotheses are considered, no clear-cut and simple suggestions emerge. In particular, our model has shown that: (i) it is not true that a elitetourism strategy is always associated with higher profit for destination: under some (general) circumstances, mass-tourism can be preferable (even if high marginal cost of production may hinder the mass development strategy); (ii) it is not true that the introduction of new products is always beneficial to the aggregate profits of a system of tourism destinations, even when the introduction of new products is costless; (iii) the optimal degree of differentiation among different destinations is positive (but finite, provided that increasing differentiation is costly); the individually optimal degree of differentiation is generally lower than the socially optimal level. In general, an active role of policy-making is necessary for an appropriate design of the development of the tourism market. 
